Well, the world didn’t spin off its own axis in the last week, for the most part. So, we’ll pick up where we left off in the last entry, more or less, and call this Part II.

As noted before, the usual suspects are back trying to jam “hope and change” down the throats of everyone who doesn’t buy into the Soros sponsored ActBlue Jewish/Marxist utopian fantasy. Frankly, it was to be expected the moment Trump won the election last year. Anyone other than The Kackler and Tampon Tim would have elicited the same response. But this time it’s different, and all the more worrisome. While the DemocRATs spin in circles trying to find a direction politically, the real powers behind their neo-Communist agenda got their house in order and fine-tuned their methods to the point that they no longer need a George Floyd to rally the troops.

Now, they have shadowy “grass roots” organizations that offer a one-size-fits-all activism to any Liberal Lemming they can reach. In short, by keeping their antifa bootlickers on a tight leash, they’ve mainstreamed their appeal, thereby surreptitiously turning mom-and-pop do-gooders, some with legitimate complaints, into unwitting pro-communist activists. They learned their lesson from the previous summer of “mostly peaceful” protests.

This change in strategy was by design. And though it pains me to say this, we might take a page from their book.

In 2008, trans-activist and Harvard professor Erica Chenoweth co-authored a paper with Maria Stephan—a principal in the far-left Horizons Project and member of the Jewish led Council on Foreign Relations— in the publication International Security, titled: Why Civil Resistance Works- The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. The authors have since published a book of the same title. And clearly, Soros and his Liberal Lemmings have read it.

The premise of their paper is simple: Non-violent campaigns tend to be more effective than violent insurgencies in creating real change.

Little of the literature, however, comprehensively analyzes all known observations of nonviolent and violent insurgencies as analogous resistance types. This study aims to fill this gap by systematically exploring the strategic effectiveness of violent and nonviolent campaigns in conflicts between nonstate and state actors using aggregate data on major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006.”

They also cite several specific examples that include: Serbia (2000), Madagascar (2002), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004–05), Lebanon (2005), and Nepal (2006), and I’ll give you the punch-line now: their findings show that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent resistance campaigns.

Frankly, they probably could have looked at the history of the NSDAP and arrived at the same conclusion: how the violent Putsch attempt in November 1923 failed, but after changing tactics and gathering broad support nationally, Hitler was able to achieve his political goals using more peaceful and socially acceptable methods. But the authors probably wouldn’t have received the same degree of funding if their work had highlighted how smart and politically savvy Hitler was.

Still, the paper has much to say that is noteworthy. First, they defined a “resistance campaign” as: “… a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective. A campaign can last anywhere from days to years. Campaigns have discernible leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts.”

They also looked at what forms or methods the resistance might take:

• Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence;
• Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating;
• Activities include: boycotts, strikes, protests (always popular), and organized noncooperation.

The paper’s assertions makes a sort of “common sense”, as it were, but it was still nice to see actual data and evidence for their underlying assumption, which they provide. It is well written, and well researched. They examine the effectiveness of non-violence by using a scientific approach: forming hypotheses and then collecting data and determining if it proves or disproves them (always difficult with historical or sociological research). After determining, in a general sense, that non-violent campaigns are, in fact, more effective at achieving their goals than violent ones, they looked at some of the common elements of these campaigns and formed their hypotheses:

• Hypothesis 1: The willingness of the regime to use violence will increase the likelihood for success among nonviolent campaigns, but disadvantage violent campaigns.
• Hypothesis 2: Nonviolent resistance has a relative advantage over violent resistance in producing loyalty shifts within security forces.
• Hypothesis 3: International sanctions and overt state support for the campaign will advantage nonviolent campaigns over violent campaigns.

The findings were:

• Hypothesis 1: In the face of regime crackdowns, nonviolent campaigns are more than six-times likelier to achieve full success than violent campaigns. Repressive regimes are also twelve times likelier to grant limited concessions to nonviolent campaigns than to violent ones.
• Hypothesis 2: Regarding loyalty-shifts within security forces, defections more quadrupled the chances of non-violent campaign success.
• Hypothesis 3: Interestingly, non-violent campaigns did receive greater international support, but the form that support took was key: with overt external support the campaign was three-times more likely to succeed. International sanctions, however, had no impact.

Finally, when comparing violent verse non-violent campaigns, the reasons for success of the latter include:

• a campaign’s commitment to nonviolent methods enhances its domestic and international legitimacy and encourages more broad-based participation in the resistance, which translates into increased pressure being brought to bear on the target.
• whereas governments easily justify violent counterattacks against armed insurgents, regime violence against nonviolent movements is more likely to backfire against the regime. This backfire can help work for the non-violent campaign by:
  • increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance campaign;
  • creating dissent and conflicts among the opponent’s supporters;
  • increasing external support for the resistance campaign;
  • and decreasing external support for the opponent;
  • Internally, members of a regime—including civil servants, security forces, and members of the judiciary—are more likely to shift loyalty toward nonviolent opposition groups than toward violent opposition groups.

Interestingly, they also isolated two different types or reasons for non-violent resistance, and this is quite telling: Strategic, and Principled. When most people think of non-violent protests, they likely refer to Gandhi’s efforts, or those of Martin Luther King, Jr. But these were non-violent because of principals, that is, ethical considerations that held violence itself to be wrong. Thus, Principled Non-Violence.

The other form, Strategic, is what we are seeing today- and partly why it is more worrisome. It is a calculated non-violence designed to achieve an end, usually the winning over of hearts-and-minds for the cause. It’s proponents use non-violence as a tool to achieve the benefits noted above and increase public support, nothing more. Likewise, when nonviolent methods do not physically threaten members of the security forces (police, military, etc) or a regime’s civil servants, members of the regime are more likely to shift loyalties toward nonviolent movements rather than toward violent ones.

When the regime can no longer rely on the continued cooperation of its security forces or other groups crucial to its control, its grip on power is undermined.

You may wonder where I’m going with all of this. It all seems very “down in the weeds”. And it is. Let me explain: The non-violent resistance methods are all the more terrifying for us, as compared to the previous Liberal Lemming protest methods that alienated mainstream America, because historically they seem to work, and we are seeing them put into practice now, on our streets, every month. True, as the authors of the study acknowledge, “Characterizing a campaign as nonviolent or violent simplifies a complex constellation of resistance methods as movements often exhibit elements of both.” But, again, the data shows that non-violent campaigns are more effective. Keep this in mind during the next 50501 Movement or HandsOFF! Protest. Yes, it’s non-violent, but not because they are non-violent or interested in tolerating your White values. They are adopting a posture to further their own agenda, nothing more.

Comrades, forget the low-hanging-fruit of violent antifa demonstrations- which are very easy to push back against. This new strategy requires us to keep our heads up, our hands down, and our message clear and persuasive so that our White brothers and sisters don’t get sucked up into the false but carefully tailored “one-size-fits-all” communist narrative. It is an attempt to restore the chaos and anti-White agenda of the Obama/Biden years by hiding the chaos and pretending that their “inclusivity” includes straight Whites. It does, begrudgingly… until they get back into power.

Amerika Erwache!

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